What Makes ‘Me’ Today the Same Person as ‘Me’ Tomorrow? Theories of Personal Identity
This is one of the key topics explored in undergraduate philosophy and covers a range of views from (i) all that matters for regarding someone as the same person from one day to the next is psychological continuity (i.e. if a different body woke up with my consciousness then that is still me) to (ii) all that matters is physical continuity (i.e. even if I woke up with someone else's consciousness then that is still me).
An initial introduction to the core theories is followed by a discussion of some of the bizarre implications of each theory. For example, (i) implies that if two different bodies woke up with your consciousness they are both you, but given that these will then go on to interact with the world differently and have different conscious experience, they will not be psychologically continuous with each other (has the odd implication that, whilst they are both you, they aren't the same person as they aren’t psychologically continuous with each other!).
This is a fascinating topic, providing a close insight into the manner in which philosophers approach ideas: starting with our intuitive ideas about something (in this case that “personhood” has something to do with psychological or physical continuity) and then interrogating the odd implications of each strand of thought in order to assess which strands of thought are integral to a theory and which are (essentially) distractions/confusions.
Host: Learn from Oxford University Alan Webster Prize for Philosophy recipient, Becky.
Duration: Suggested 1-2 hours, dependent on the level of detail desired.
